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Abstract. A SOAP message can be affected by a DoS attack if the incoming 
message has been either created or modified maliciously. The specifications of 
existing security standards do not focus on this type of attack. This article 
presents a novel distributed and adaptive approach for dealing with DoS attacks 
in Web Service environments, which represents an alternative to the existing 
centralized solutions. The solution proposes a distributed hierarchical multi-
agent architecture that implements a classification mechanism in two phases. 
The main benefits of the approach are the distributed capabilities of the multi-
agent systems and the self-adaption ability to the changes that occur in the 
patterns of attack. A prototype of the architecture was developed and the results 
obtained are presented in this study.  
Keywords: Multi-agent System, CBR, Web Service, SOAP Message, DoS 
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1   Introduction 
The Web services processing model requires the ability to secure SOAP messages and 
XML documents as they are forwarded along potentially long and complex chains of 
consumer, provider, and intermediary services. However all standards that have been 
proposed to date, such as WS-Security [1], WS-Policy [2], WS-Trust [3], WS-
SecureConversation [4], etc. focus on the aspects of message integrity and confidentiality 
and user authentication and authorization [5]. 
Until now, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have not been dealt with in Web Services 
environments. A DoS attack on Web Services takes advantage of the time involved in 
processing XML formatted SOAP messages. The DoS attack is successfully carried 
out when it manages to severely compromise legitimate user access to services and 
resources. XML messages must be parsed in the server, which opens the possibility of 
an attack if the messages themselves are not well structured or if they include some 
type of malicious code. Resources available in the server (memory and CPU cycles) 
can be drastically reduced or exhausted while a malicious SOAP message is being 
parsed. 
This article presents a novel distributed multi-agent architecture for dealing with DoS 
attacks in Web Services environments. Additionally, the architecture has a four-tiered 
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hierarchical design that is better capable of task distribution and error recovery. The 
most important characteristic of the proposed solution is the two-phased mechanism 
that was designed to classify SOAP messages. The first phase applies the initial filter 
for detecting simple attacks without requiring an excessive amount of resources. The 
second phase involves a more complex process which ends up using a significantly 
higher amount of resources.  Each of the phases incorporates a CBR-BDI [6] agent 
with reasoning, learning and adaptation capabilities. The CBR engine initiates what is 
known as the CBR cycle, which is comprised of 4 phases. The first agent uses a 
decision tree and the second a neural network, each of which is incorporated into the 
respective reuse phase of the CBR cycle. As a result, the system can learn and adapt 
to the attacks and the changes in the techniques used in the attacks. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the problem that 
has prompted most of this research. Section 3 focuses on the design of the proposed 
architecture. Finally, section 4 presents the results and conclusions obtained by the 
research. 
2   DoS Attacks Description 
One of the most frequent techniques of a DoS attack is to exhaust available resources 
(memory, CPU cycles, and bandwidth) on the host server. The probability of a DoS 
attack increases with applications providing Web Services because of their intrinsic 
use of the XML standard. In order to obtain interoperability between platforms, 
communication between web servers is carried out via an exchange of messages. 
These messages, referred to as SOAP messages, are based on XML standard and are 
primarily exchanged using HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) [7]. The server uses 
a parser, such as DOM, Xerces, etc. to syntactically analyze all incoming XML 
formatted SOAP messages. When the server draws too much of its available resources 
to parse SOAP messages that are either poorly written or include a malicious code, it 
risks becoming completely blocked. 
Attacks usually occur when the SOAP message either comes from a malicious user 
or is intercepted during its transmission by a malicious node that introduces different 
kinds of attacks. 
The following list contains descriptions of some known types of attacks that can 
result in a DoS attack, as noted in [8, 9, 10]. 
 
• Oversize Payload: It reduces or eliminates the availability of a Web Service when 
the CPU, memory or bandwidth are being tied up by the processing of messages 
with an enormous payload. 
• Coercive Parsing: Just like a message written with XML, an XML parser can 
analyze a complex format and lead to an attack when the memory and processing 
resources of the server are being used up.  
• Injection XML: This is based on the ability to modify the structure of an XML 
document when an unfiltered user entry goes directly to the XML stream. The 
message is captured and modified during its transmission. 
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• SOAP header attack: Some SOAP message headers are overwritten while they 
are passing through different nodes before arriving at their destination.  
• Replay Attack: Sent messages are completely valid, but they are sent en masse 
over short periods of time in order to overload the Web Service server. 
 
All Web Services security standards focus on strategies independent from DoS 
attacks. Other measures have been proposed that do not focus directly on dealing with 
DoS attacks, but can deal with some of the inherent techniques. One solution based on 
the XML firewall was proposed to protect Web Services in more detail [8]. By 
applying a syntactic analysis, a validation mechanism, and filtering policies, it is 
possible to identify attacks in individual or group messages. An adaptive framework 
for the prevention and detection of intrusions was presented in [9]. Based on a hybrid 
focus that combines agents, data mining and diffused logic, it is supposed to filter 
attacks that are either already known or new. The solution as presented is an incipient 
idea still being developed and implemented. Finally, another solution proposed the 
use of Honeypots as a highly flexible security tool [11]. The focus incorporates 3 
components: data extraction based on honeyd and tedpdum data analysis, and 
extraction from attack signatures. Its main inconvenience is that it depends too much 
on the ability of the head of security to define when a signature is or is not a type of 
attack. Even when the techniques mentioned claim to prevent attacks on Web 
Services, few provide statistics on the rates of detection, false positives, false 
negatives and any negative effects on application performance. 
3   An Agent Based Architecture 
Agents are characterized by their autonomy; which gives them the ability to work 
independently in real-time environments [12]. Furthermore, when they are integrated 
within a multi-agent system they can also offer collaborative and distributed 
assistance in carrying out tasks [13].  
The main characteristic of the multi-agent architecture proposed in this paper is the 
incorporation of CBR-BDI [6] deliberative agents. The CBR-BDI classifier agents 
implemented here use an intrusion detection technique known as anomaly detection. 
In order to carry out this type of detection, it is necessary to extract information from 
the HTTP/TCP-IP protocol headers that are used for transporting messages, as well as 
from the structure and content of the SOAP message, the message processing tasks, 
and any activity among Web Services users.  
Our proposal is a distributed, hierarchical multi-agent architecture integrated for 4 
levels with distinct BDI agents. The hierarchical structure makes it possible to 
distribute tasks on the different levels of the architectures and to define specific 
responsibilities. Meanwhile, it is essential to maintain a continuous interaction and 
communication between agents, as they must be able to continue requesting services 
and deliver results. The architecture presented in figure 1 shows the four levels with 
BDI agents organized according to their roles. 
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Fig. 1. Design of the multi-agent architecture proposed 
The following section describes the functionality of the agents located in each 
layer of the proposed hierarchical structure.  
 
• Listener agents: Capture any traffic directed towards the server and process the 
HTTP and TCP/IP protocol headers that are used to transport SOAP messages. 
JPCAP is used to identify and capture any traffic that contains SOAP message 
packets. The information extracted from the HTTP/TCP-IP transport protocol 
message headers is sent to the next layer in order to carry out the classification 
process. In addition to these tasks, Listener agents use an IP register to monitor 
user activities. This type of monitoring makes it possible to identify suspicious 
activities similar to message replication attacks. 
• Classifier-L1 agents: These CBR-BDI agents are located on layer 2 of the 
architecture and are in charge of executing the first phase of the classification 
process based on the data sent by the Listener agents. These agents initiate a 
classification by incorporating a CBR engine that in turn incorporates a decision 
tree strategy in the reuse phase. The main goal of this initial phase is to carry out an 
effective classification, but without requiring an excessive amount of resources. 
The case description for this CBR is shown in Table 1 and involves various fields 
extracted from the HTTP/TCP-IP transport protocol message headers.  
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Table 1. Case Description First Phase - CBR 
Fields Type 
IDService Int 






Within the CBR cycle, specifically in the reuse phase, a particular 
classification strategy is used by applying a knowledge extraction method 
known as Classification and Regression Tree (CART), which creates 3 groups: 
legal, malicious and suspicious. Messages that are classified as legal are sent to 
the corresponding Web Service for processing. Malicious messages are 
immediately rejected, while suspicious messages continue through to the 
classification process. 
• Classifier-L2 agents: These CBR-BDI agents carry out the second phase of 
classification from layer 3 of the architecture. In order to initiate this phase, it is 
necessary to have previously started a syntactic analysis on the SOAP message 
to extract the required data. This syntactic analysis is performed by the Parser 
Agent. Once the data have been extracted from the message, a CBR mechanism 
is initiated by using a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) neural network in the reuse 
phase. Table 2 presents the fields used in describing the case for the CBR in this 
layer. 
Table 2. Case Description Second Phase - CBR 














The neural network is trained from the similar cases that were recovered in 
the retrieve phase. Once the neural network has been trained, the new case is 
presented to the network for classification as either legal or malicious. 
However, because there is a possibility of significant errors occurring in the 
training phase of the neural network, an expert will be in charge of the final 
review for classifying the message.  
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• Supervisor Agent: This agent supervises the Parser agent since there still exists 
the possibility of an attack during the syntactic processing of the SOAP message. 
This agent is located in layer 3 of the architecture. 
• Parser Agent: This agent executes the syntactic analysis of the SOAP message. 
The analysis is performed using SAX as parser. Because SAX is an event driven 
API, it is most efficient primarily with regards to memory usage, and strong 
enough to deal with attack techniques. The data extracted from the syntactic 
analysis are sent to the Classifier L-2 agents. This agent is also located on layer 3 
of the architecture. 
• Coordinator Agent: This agent is in charge of supervising the correct overall 
functioning of the architecture. Additionally, it oversees the classification process 
in the first and second phase. Each time a classification is tagged as suspicious, 
the agent interacts with the Interface Agent to request an expert review. Finally, 
this agent controls the alert mechanism and coordinates the actions required for 
responding to this type of attack. 
• Interface Agent: This agent was designed to function in different devices (PDA, 
Laptop, Workstation). It facilitates ubiquitous communication with the security 
personnel when an alert has been sent by the Coordinator Agent.  Additionally, it 
facilitates the process of adjusting the global configuration of the architecture. 
This agent is also located in the highest layer of the architecture. 
4   Results and Conclusions 
This article has presented a distributed hierarchical multi-agent architecture for 
classifying SOAP messages. The architecture was designed to exploit the distributed 
capacity of the agents. Additionally, an advanced classification mechanism was 
designed to filter incoming SOAP messages. The classification mechanism was 
structured in two phases, each of which includes a special CBR-BDI agent that 
functions as a classifier. The first phase filters simple attacks without exhausting an 
excessive amount of resources by applying a CBR engine that incorporates a decision 
tree.  The second phase, a bit more complex and costly, is in charge of classifying the 
SOAP messages that were not classified in the first phase. This phase applies a CBR 
engine that incorporates a neural network. A prototype of our proposed solution was 
based on a classification mechanism and developed in order to evaluate its 
effectiveness. Figure 2 shows the results obtained for a set of SOAP messages. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of prediction with regards to the number of patterns 
(SOAP messages) for the classification mechanism. It is clear that as the number of 
patterns increases, the success rate of prediction also increases in terms of percentage. 
This is influenced by the fact that we are working with CBR systems, which depend 
on a larger amount of data stored in the memory of cases.  
Future works are expected to develop the tools for obtaining a complete solution 
and to evaluate the successfulness in repelling and detecting attacks. With the 
advantage of a distributed process for classification tasks, it would be possible to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the classification mechanism, and the response time. 
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Fig. 2. Effectiveness of the classification mechanism integrated according to the number of 
patterns 
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